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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a Data Envelopment Analysis/Malmquist Index (DEA/MI) analysis 
for measuring changes in nation stability, which is defined as the state of a country’s so-
cial and economic system as measured by multiple evaluation indicators. Applying the 
DEA to the panel data for 97 countries during 1981–2004, we evaluate nation stability 
quantitatively, and observe its transitions. This analysis includes a unified country (Ger-
many) and split countries (former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia). Using 
the novel DEA/Cumulative MI application proposed in this study, we demonstrate shifts 
in stability before/after the unification or split. Our analysis shows that the stability gap 
between the most stable countries and other countries expanded after the end of the cold 
war, until 2004. The stability of split countries fell typically by 50% or more, so they were 
extremely unstable before the split. The use of the lower-bound DEA together with the or-
dinary DEA enables a country’s stability to be evaluated in terms of both its negative and 
positive aspects. 
 
 
Keywords: Nation stability; Indicators of country stability; Merger and split; Data 
envelopment analysis; Malmquist index; Unified country; Split country 
 
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Various degrees of political, economic, and social stability exist in individual countries. People 
suffer from problems that may have originated in their own country or come from abroad. Na-
turally, problems and instability have a negative influence on the diplomatic relations between 
countries, including their political and economic aspects. Therefore we arbitrarily judge whether 
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a country is stable or unstable by synthetically treating various problems that surround that par-
ticular country. However, this evaluation must be fair-minded and objective because it is related 
to private/public decision-making in international activities. Transnational threats emerging 
from a country that terrify adjacent countries and even those further afield, need to be consi-
dered in any notion of stability. In this study, we deal with the way in which a country’s stability 
affects both domestic and foreign decision-making in various fields. We refer to this overall 
concept as “nation stability.”  
This paper quantitatively measures the nation stability of 97 countries (see Table A.1) and 
examines how their nation stability changed during the period 1981–2004. Each country’s sta-
bility is deeply related to the quality-of-life (QOL) of its citizenry. It is important to evaluate 
nation stability because it tends to play a very large role in determining the QOL of an unstable 
country. In the case of international relations, researchers have analyzed bilateral relationships 
by using scored event data (Goldstein 1992; Bond et al. 2003), the impact of terrorism or war-
fare (Nitsch and Schumacher 2004), and the effect of all types of conflict (Blomberg and Hess 
2006) on international trade. Mirza and Verdier (2008) surveyed the recent economic literature 
on terrorism, and discussed the increase in security costs related to terrorism prevention. Their 
paper, however, does not employ a direct measure of nation stability. Measuring nation stability 
is significant for a clear understanding of both individual countries and international relations. 
Rotberg (2003, 2004) discussed failed states qualitatively, but nation stability has never been 
analyzed quantitatively. One critical reason for this lack is that nation stability is difficult to de-
fine universally, because its form is intangible and its evaluation is never completely objective. 
With these limitations in mind, but with a firm recognition of the external influences that each 
country exerts on the rest of the world, we here try to measure nation stability.  
To establish a framework for nation stability, we begin by defining stability in terms of the 
state of a social and economic system (influenced by both internal and external factors), as 
measured by multiple evaluation indicators. When multiple indicators are employed, their 
weighted sum is generally taken as an integrated measure of all indicators. However, it is diffi-
cult not only to define such a weighting a priori, but also to interpret it when deriving through a 
particular multivariate technique. We thus employ a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (e.g., 
Cooper et al. 2000), which is a well-known and respected methodology that can circumvent 
dealing with fixed weights. We can thus establish a flexibly defined weighting system across the 
decision-making units (DMUs) that are being evaluated. 
     DEA is a mathematical programming technique for measuring the relative efficiency of 
DMUs that have multiple inputs and outputs. Specifically, for the current research, we replace 
the inputs with negative indicators (the smaller the value, the better), and the outputs with posi-
tive indicators (the greater the value, the better), thus enabling an evaluation of each DMU’s 
nation stability. 
     In this respect, we note that inputs produce outputs, but negative indicators do not, under 
any circumstances, produce positive indicators. We thus view our effort as different from a 
“standard” DEA production efficiency analysis. Our approach was originally proposed by Ha-
shimoto and Ishikawa (1993), and then discussed/applied in Hashimoto (1993, 1996, 1997), 
Hashimoto and Kodama (1997), Zhu (2001), Reisman et al. (2002), Murias et al. (2006, 2008), 
Hashimoto et al. (2009), and Somarriba and Pena (2009). We now examine transitions in nation 
stability using a DEA/Malmquist Index (DEA/MI) approach (e.g., Färe et al. 1994; Thanassoulis 
2001), which is actually a DEA time series that accounts for a shifting frontier. This approach 
enables measurement of the ratio of DEA efficiencies in two different time periods that have 
dynamic (shifting) efficiency frontiers. Given the inputs and outputs identified in this paper, we 
can then quantitatively evaluate changes in nation stability.  
Methodologically, we propose a new application of DEA/MI to cases of DMU merger and 
splitting. Specifically, our analysis includes unified Germany and the successor countries of the 
split Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. It should be noted that the traditional me-
thod of applying DEA/MI cannot explain the changes in nation stability across the boundary of 
a serious juncture (i.e., before/after the year of unification or splitting). In addition to analyzing 
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each country’s shifts in nation stability, we demonstrate graphic shifts of the unified/split coun-
tries taken together. We thus apply DEA/MI to DMU mergers and splits. Indicator panel data for 
97 countries (including Taiwan) during 1981–2004 (excluding only 1993) are analyzed, in order 
to discuss change in each country’s nation stability across the entire study period. 
 
 
2  Nation stability 
 
2.1  Notion of nation stability  
 
Nation stability in this study is a general concept that is defined in such a way as to be useful to 
people engaged in diverse international activities, such as political, economic, and cultural ex-
change. Although each country’s vulnerability is already recognized as an internal steadiness 
that incorporates influences from outside, nation stability has a more comprehensive meaning 
that impacts international organizations, foreign relations, and foreign investment. In addition to 
domestic influences, nation stability accounts for influences that come from abroad, and also 
influences that manifest abroad. Each country’s state of stability is generally divided into a so-
cial aspect and an economic aspect. The economic phase needs to be analyzed independently 
from the state of society, because the national economy has significance both at home and 
abroad. Let us now take a look at failed nation-states, in order to differentiate the concrete eco-
nomic and social states for evaluating overall nation stability. 
 
 
2.2 Study of failed states 
 
Rotberg (2003, 2004) established criteria by examining contemporary cases of nation-state fail-
ure due to generic weakness or apparent distress, and the consequent collapse from failure. His 
analysis involved a gradual scale from weak state to failing state to failed state, according to the 
likelihood of failure. He defined a collapsed state as the extreme end of the spectrum, beyond 
“failed state.” His criterion for this classification is the country’s ability to deliver political 
goods to persons living within its designated borders. Rotberg utilized a hierarchy of political 
goods, with security ranked at the top, above political freedom (civil liberties), medical care, 
education, and infrastructure maintenance, all of which he placed at a subordinate level. How-
ever, these political goods are intangible and hard to quantify. 
Rotberg further classified nation-states into two groups: strong states and weak states. The 
former countries unequivocally control their territories and deliver a full range of high-quality 
political goods to their citizens. In such a country, public safety and political liberty are both 
well maintained, education and medical care are solid, and GDP per capita is high, with steady 
economic growth. The latter countries are inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or 
economic constraints. They experience many serious problems, such as internal antagonisms, 
mismanagement, greed, despotism, external attacks, high crime rates, communal tensions, the 
deterioration of the services of schools and hospitals, and deteriorated physical infrastructure. 
Naturally their economic growth and business climate tend to stagnate or worsen. Rotberg thus 
elucidated the conditions of nation-states according to both the quality and the quantity of the 
political goods that they provide to their people. 
A country’s weakness or strength, as described by Rotberg, is identical with our notion of 
nation stability, except that he omits the external influences that impact foreign countries. In 
view of the significance of such outward influences, we define nation stability in broader terms.  
 
 
2.3  Framework for evaluating nation stability 
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Nation stability embraces both internal and external stability. The former corresponds to the 
domestic state of being, namely the national affairs that depend on government operations. The 
latter involves matters in which the country in question is a significant constituent of an interna-
tional community.  
    In Figure 1, we present our comprehensive framework of nation stability, in which a 
country’s state is described in terms of four aspects: internal economy, external economy, inter-
nal society, and external society. Rotberg’s notion of stability is conceptually equivalent to the 
white part (designated as portion i), which, roughly speaking, occupies three-fourths of a coun-
try’s stability. The missing fourth is the outward influence of external aspects exerted on other 
countries. We think that nation stability must include international threats and contributions that 
a country sends abroad (designated as portion ii). In other words, nation stability includes mu-
tual international-influence: both halves of each external aspect, thus accommodating influences 
to and from the world at large. So we define an entire country (portion iii) by adding the gray 
part (portion ii: influences that flow outward) to Rotberg’s notion. In Table 1, we illustrate each 
of the four aspects with representative examples of the phenomena. The metric in this paper is 
thus defined in terms of stability in the four aspects of social and economic systems.  
 
 
3    Methodology 
 
Since DEA/MI is employed as the analytic method of choice in the current study, we now brief-
ly discuss its underlying principles, following the explanation given by Hashimoto et al. (2009). 
 
 
3.1  DEA and negative DEA 
 
DEA was first presented in a seminal article by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (CCR, 1978). 
Mathematically, the CCR model, in its weak efficiency and ratio form, generates an efficiency 
score for decision-making unit(s) (DMU) of interest 𝑗0, 𝑔𝑗0 (0 ≤ 𝑔𝑗0 ≤ 1). It is formulated as 
the following fractional program (FP): 
 
                                                      Maximize      𝑔𝑗0 =
 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗0
𝑡
𝑟=1
 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗0
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
                                                   subject to     
 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑡
𝑟=1
 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1
≤ 1,   𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑛                                      (1) 
                                      𝑢𝑟 , 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑟 = 1,… , 𝑡, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚,  
 
where: 𝑛 = number of DMUs, 𝑦𝑟𝑗  = output 𝑟 from DMU 𝑗, 𝑢𝑟   = weight assigned to output 
𝑟, 𝑡 = number of outputs, 𝑥𝑖𝑗  = input 𝑖 from DMU 𝑗, 𝑣𝑖  = weight assigned to input 𝑖, and 
𝑚 = number of inputs. 
We can generate DEA scores 𝑔𝑗0  for all DMUs by solving (1) 𝑛 times, setting each 
DMU as the target DMU 𝑗0 in turn. Here, DMUs 𝑗0 with the optimum 𝑔𝑗0
∗ = 1 are judged 
DEA efficient, while those with 𝑔𝑗0
∗ < 1 are defined as DEA inefficient. 
     Using (1), DEA judges any DMU producing more outputs with fewer inputs relatively 
efficient (DEA efficient). In our nation stability analysis, where the inputs and outputs are re-
placed, respectively, by negative and positive evaluation indicators, any DMU having greater 
positive indicators and smaller negative indicators is judged to be “relatively stable.” Thus, the 
score 𝑔𝑗0  in our analysis is a metric of nation stability. We can accept such a metric under the 
circumstances in which nation stability has been a concept without a consensus definition. 
DMUs 𝑗0 with 𝑔𝑗0
∗ = 1 might thus be judged to have a “best stability,” while those with 
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𝑔𝑗0
∗ < 1 will simply possess a “not-best stability.” Further, since the DEA model in a nation 
stability context does not measure efficiency, we need not take the DMU scale (as measured by 
model inputs or outputs) into consideration in computing the nation stability ratio 𝑔𝑗0 . Thus, we 
employ the CCR model rather than that of Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC, 1984). 
As the maximization of (1) shows, ordinary DEA is an upper-bound evaluation focusing 
on each DMU’s superiority. To evaluate nation stability in terms of both “good” and “bad” re-
spects, we introduce the following DEA variation, “negative DEA” as a lower-bound evaluation 
(Yamada et al. 1994; Doyle et al. 1995). In contrast with (1), the model, in its weak efficiency 
and ratio form, is: 
 
                                                      Minimize      𝑓𝑗0 =
 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗0
𝑡
𝑟=1
 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗0
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
                                                   subject to     
 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑡
𝑟=1
 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1
≥ 1,   𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑛                                      (2) 
                                      𝑢𝑟 , 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑟 = 1,… , 𝑡, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚. 
 
Here, the negative-DEA score of target DMU 𝑗0, 𝑓𝑗0 ≥ 1, and DMUs 𝑗0 with 𝑓𝑗0
∗ = 1, 
are on the DEA rear boundary (negative-DEA frontier). In our analysis, any DMU having 
smaller positive and greater negative social indicators is judged “relatively bad.” Thus, DMUs 
𝑗0 with 𝑓𝑗0
∗ = 1 should be judged as having “DEA worst instability,” while DMUs 𝑗0 with 
𝑓𝑗0
∗ > 1 would have “DEA not-worst instability.” 
 
 
3.2  DEA/MI analysis 
 
DEA/MI analysis measures the Malmquist (productivity) index (Malmquist 1953) within a DEA 
framework. Figure 2 presents a single input and output DEA case in which DMU 𝑗0 was at 
point A in period 𝛼, and line OCD represents the CCR DEA frontier. The input-oriented effi-
ciency of DMU 𝑗0 is then measured by 𝑃𝐶/𝑃𝐴 (< 1, DEA inefficient). When point A is on 
the frontier, its score is 1 (DEA efficient). Suppose that, in period 𝛽 (𝛽 > 𝛼), DMU 𝑗0 has 
moved to point B, and that the frontier itself has also shifted, to line OEF. The efficiency change 
in DMU 𝑗0 can be measured by the ratio of its DEA score in period 𝛽 to that in period 𝛼; 
however, the frontier has shifted, so that we must compute the geometric mean of the ratios for 
the two frontiers in those same periods. This is the DEA (CCR input-oriented)/Malmquist index 
for DMU 𝑗0 between periods 𝛼 and 𝛽, given in (3): 
 
                                                     𝑀𝐼𝑗0 𝛼 ,𝛽 ≡  
𝑄𝐷 𝑄𝐵 
𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝐴 
∙
𝑄𝐹 𝑄𝐵 
𝑃𝐸 𝑃𝐴 
 
1 2 
 .                                            3  
 
Here 𝑀𝐼 > 1 implies a gain in DEA efficiency by DMU 𝑗0  from period 𝛼 to 𝛽, while 
𝑀𝐼 = 1 and 𝑀𝐼 < 1 imply stasis and loss, respectively. 
     Transforming (3), the Malmquist index can be decomposed into two components, as 
follows: 
 
                                                𝑀𝐼𝑗0 𝛼 ,𝛽 =
𝑄𝐹 𝑄𝐵 
𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝐴 
×  
𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝐴 
𝑃𝐸 𝑃𝐴 
∙
𝑄𝐷 𝑄𝐵 
𝑄𝐹 𝑄𝐵 
 
1 2 
                               (4) 
                                                                     = 𝐶𝑈𝑗0  𝛼 ,𝛽  × 𝐹𝑆𝑗0 𝛼 ,𝛽 .                                             (5) 
 
As the first term on the right hand side (RHS) of  4  shows, 𝐶𝑈 expresses the Catch-Up in-
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dex. That is, 𝐶𝑈 > 1 suggests that DMU 𝑗0 has moved closer to the period 𝛽 frontier than to 
that for period 𝛼. 𝐶𝑈 = 1 or 𝐶𝑈 < 1 thus applies when an identical or greater distance, re-
spectively, is involved. We define the second term on the RHS of  4  as the Frontier Shift (𝐹𝑆) 
index, where 𝐹𝑆 > 1 means a gain in the DEA frontier shift from period 𝛼 to 𝛽, as measured 
from DMU 𝑗0. That is, the frontier has moved forward, generating more output but with less 
input (see corresponding arrow in Figure 2). As in previous cases, 𝐹𝑆 = 1 and 𝐹𝑆 < 1 imply 
no change and loss (shift backward), respectively. 
     Since 𝑃𝐸 𝑃𝐴  in Figure 2 is, for example, the DEA score 𝑔𝑗0  of the period 𝛼 DMU 𝑗0 
measured by means of the period 𝛽 frontier, we denote it as  𝑔𝑗0  𝐷
𝛼 ,𝐹𝛽  . Then, from (4), we 
obtain:  
 
                          𝑀𝐼𝑗0 𝛼 ,𝛽 =
 𝑔𝑗0 𝐷
𝛽  ,𝐹𝛽  
 𝑔𝑗0  𝐷
𝛼  ,𝐹𝛼  
×  
 𝑔𝑗0 𝐷
𝛼  ,𝐹𝛼  
 𝑔𝑗0 𝐷
𝛼  ,𝐹𝛽  
∙
 𝑔𝑗0  𝐷
𝛽  ,𝐹𝛼  
𝑔𝑗0 𝐷
𝛽  ,𝐹𝛽  
 
1 2 
.                       (6) 
 
In (1), letting 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝛼 , 𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝛼 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑦𝑟𝑗 , respectively, in period 𝛼,  𝑔𝑗0  𝐷
𝛼  ,𝐹𝛼   can be obtained as 
the optimum of the following FP, which is the classic DEA model: 
 
                                                     𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒      𝑔𝑗0 =
 𝑢𝑟
𝑡
𝑟=1 𝑦𝑟𝑗0
𝛼
 𝑣𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖𝑗0
𝛼  
                                                  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜     
 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗0
𝛼𝑡
𝑟=1
 𝑣𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖𝑗0
𝛼 ≤ 1,   𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑛,                                  (7) 
                                      𝑢𝑟 , 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑟 = 1,⋯ , 𝑡, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚.   
 
 𝑔𝑗0  𝐷
𝛽  ,𝐹𝛽   can also be obtained using the FP in (7) by replacing 𝛼 with 𝛽. 
     While  𝑔𝑗0  𝐷
𝛼  ,𝐹𝛽   is obtained as the optimum of 
 
                                               Maximize      𝑔𝑗0 =
 𝑢𝑟
𝑡
𝑟=1 𝑦𝑟𝑗0
𝛼
 𝑣𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖𝑗0
𝛼  
                                                   subject to     
 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗0
𝛽𝑡
𝑟=1
 𝑣𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖𝑗0
𝛽
≤ 1,   𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑛,                                   (8) 
                                     𝑢𝑟 ,𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑟 = 1,⋯ , 𝑡, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚,   
 
this forms the DEA exclusion model (Andersen and Petersen 1993). Finally, we obtain 
 𝑔𝑗0  𝐷
𝛽  ,𝐹𝛼   by using the DEA exclusion model again, but with  𝛼 and 𝛽 switched. 
     In the current study, we use panel social indicator data from 97 countries and obtain the 
catch-up 𝐶𝑈𝑗0 𝛼,𝛽 , frontier shift 𝐹𝑆𝑗0 𝛼,𝛽 , and Malmquist 𝑀𝐼𝑗0 𝛼,𝛽  indices from period 
𝛼 to 𝛽 for country 𝑗0. It should be noted that the catch-up index compares the closeness of 
country 𝑗0 to the nation stability frontier in each period. The frontier shift index expresses the 
movement of the nation stability frontier between two periods, while the Malmquist index 
measures the change in nation stability for country 𝑗0, taking both the frontier shift and 
catch-up into consideration. Note that 𝐶𝑈𝑗0  and 𝑀𝐼𝑗0  express the movement of country 𝑗0, 
whereas 𝐹𝑆𝑗0  represents the shift of the maximum nation stability, which is composed of those 
countries having DEA-best nation stability. 𝐹𝑆𝑗0  thus implies nation stability frontier shift, as 
measured from the location (viewpoint) of country 𝑗0, where the frontier shift forward involves 
moving in the direction of greater positive indicators and smaller negative indicators. We there-
fore propose each average index for all countries as appropriate indicators of nation stability 
change on a general level. 
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     We can also describe DEA
−
/MI (negative-DEA/MI) analysis using Figure 2 (hereafter a 
minus sign superscript “−” designates negative DEA). Suppose that DMU 𝑗0 has moved from 
point A to B, while the DEA rear has shifted from OGH to OIJ between periods 𝛼 and 𝛽. Then, 
the DEA
−
/Malmquist index of DMU 𝑗0 is: 
 
                                               𝑀𝐼𝑗0
−  𝛼 ,𝛽 ≡  
𝑄𝐻 𝑄𝐵 
𝑃𝐺 𝑃𝐴 
∙
𝑄𝐽 𝑄𝐵 
𝑃𝐼 𝑃𝐴 
 
1 2 
                                                    9  
                                                                     =
𝑄𝐽 𝑄𝐵 
𝑃𝐺 𝑃𝐴 
×  
𝑃𝐺 𝑃𝐴 
𝑃𝐼 𝑃𝐴 
∙
𝑄𝐻 𝑄𝐵 
𝑄𝐽 𝑄𝐵 
 
1 2 
                         (10) 
                                                                     = 𝐶𝑈𝑗0
−  𝛼 ,𝛽  × 𝐹𝑆𝑗0
−  𝛼 ,𝛽 .                                        (11) 
 
Here, 𝑀𝐼𝑗0
−  𝛼 ,𝛽 > 1 implies a gain (i.e., increase in the DEA− efficiency score of DMU 𝑗0) 
from period 𝛼 to 𝛽; 𝐶𝑈𝑗0
−  𝛼 ,𝛽 > 1 means that DMU 𝑗0 has moved farther from the period 
𝛽 rear than from that of period 𝛼; and 𝐹𝑆𝑗0
−  𝛼 ,𝛽 > 1 means that the DEA rear has shifted 
forward, so as to have more outputs with fewer inputs (see corresponding arrow in Figure 2). In 
DEA
−
 nation stability analysis, using the average indices, we can show a nation stability “bad” 
change in general.   
Referring to (6), and denoting, for example, 𝑃𝐼 𝑃𝐴  as  𝑓𝑗0 𝐷
𝛼  ,𝑅𝛽   because it implies 
the DEA
−
 score of period 𝛼 DMU 𝑗0 measured by period 𝛽 DEA rear, 
 
                          𝑀𝐼𝑗0
−  𝛼 ,𝛽 =
 𝑓𝑗0 𝐷
𝛽  ,𝑅𝛽  
 𝑓𝑗0 𝐷
𝛼  ,𝑅𝛼  
×  
𝑓𝑗0 𝐷
𝛼  ,𝑅𝛼  
 𝑓𝑗0 𝐷
𝛼  ,𝑅𝛽  
∙
 𝑓𝑗0 𝐷
𝛽  ,𝑅𝛼 
𝑓𝑗0 𝐷
𝛽  ,𝑅𝛽  
 
1 2 
,                       (12) 
 
where each value of  𝑓𝑗0  can be computed through the FP transformed from (2), as is done 
with the ordinary DEA/Malmquist index. 
 
 
3.3  Cumulative Malmquist index 
 
Applying data to the FPs of (7) and (8), and through formulas  5  and (6), we can compute 
the catch-up 𝐶𝑈𝑗0  𝛼,𝛽 , frontier shift 𝐹𝑆𝑗0 𝛼,𝛽 , and Malmquist 𝑀𝐼𝑗0 𝛼,𝛽  indices. Normally, 
these indices, for year 𝛽, would be compared to those in the preceding year (i.e., 𝛼 = 𝛽 − 1). 
However, such annually successive indices do not seem appropriate when looking across the full 
23-year sample period. We thus employ a “cumulative” index in the spirit of Hashimoto and 
Haneda (2008). The following parameters are therefore used in the current analysis: 𝐶𝑈𝑗0  𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽 , 
𝐹𝑆𝑗0 𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽 , and  𝑀𝐼𝑗0 𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽 , where 𝛽 = 𝛼𝑠 ,…. These are then compared to the standard year 
𝛼𝑠 (the beginning of the sample period), so that they measure successive changes from the 
standard year through to year 𝛽. The cumulative index values when 𝛽 = 𝛼𝑠 are all 1. 
 
3.4  Frontier and rear shifter analysis 
 
As a point of view for analyzing individual countries, we examine each country’s influence on 
nation stability on a general level. Referring to Färe et al. (1994), we employ the following three 
conditions to determine the countries that caused a frontier forward-shift from the preceding 
year: 
 
(fa) 
𝐹𝑆𝑗0  𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽 
𝐹𝑆𝑗0  𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽−1 
> 1, (fb) 𝑔 𝐷𝛽 ,𝐹𝛽  = 1, (fc) 𝑔 𝐷𝛽 ,𝐹𝛽−1 > 1, 𝛽 = 𝛼𝑠 + 1,….   (13) 
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Likewise, the corresponding three conditions for determining which countries caused a 
rear backward-shift from the preceding year are: 
 
(ra) 
𝐹𝑆𝑗0
−  𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽 
𝐹𝑆𝑗0
−  𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽−1 
< 1, (rb) 𝑓 𝐷𝛽 ,𝑅𝛽  = 1, (rc) 𝑓 𝐷𝛽 ,𝑅𝛽−1 < 1, 𝛽 = 𝛼𝑠 + 1,….   (14) 
 
 
4  Evaluation indicators for nation stability analysis 
 
To evaluate nation stability, we gathered data for the following six indicators (categorized ac-
cording to the four aspects depicted in Figure 1).  
 
Internal economy 
 
Real GDP (per 1,000 persons) 
 
External economy 
 
Imports/GDP
*
 (%) 
 
Internal society 
 
     Terrorism
*
 (cases by country where each incident occurred) 
     Degree of political stability 
 
External society 
 
     Defense expenditure/GDP
*
 (%) 
     Susceptibility to war
* 
 
 (
*
negative indicator) 
 
These six underlying indicators are based on the following rationale. Real GDP, im-
ports/GDP, terrorism, and defense expenditure/GDP are objective indicators that clearly reflect 
the level of the four aspects. Real GDP is a chronologically representative economic indicator 
that expresses national economic activity. Real GDP divided by population substantially indi-
cates nation stability in relation to population scale. So a higher value means the country is more 
stable in terms of its internal economy. Next, imports/GDP is the self-sufficiency ratio for a 
country. This ratio indicates external economic circumstances, which reflect the quantities of 
resources (agricultural products, fossil fuels, mining resources, and self-produced goods) needed 
for industrial products and services. The more stable the country, the lower this ratio is in rela-
tion to national economic scale.  
As for terrorism, panic and mistrust damage domestic society tremendously, in addition to 
actual physical loss. Terrorism is generally defined as actions that influence the attitudes and 
behaviors of a target group wider than the immediate victims (Mickolus 1980). We consider 
terrorism to be an indicator of internal society because it generally has a severe negative-impact 
on the national way of life. In addition, a mission to prevent it typically involves the internal 
security apparatus. Mirza and Verdier (2008) verified statistically that transnational acts of ter-
rorism such as New York (2001), Madrid (2003), and London (2005) were not representative of 
most terrorism. In fact, incidents often occur in the country of origin of the perpetrators. There-
fore, we adopt total cases of terrorism in each country as a measure of the internal social aspect 
of its nation stability. The defense expenditure/GDP ratio shows military power in relation to 
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GDP. It is desirable for each country to have sufficient power to maintain its external national 
security. However, excessive force can disturb world peace by intimidating other countries, 
which may suspect aggression. The higher this indicator, the lower is nation stability. 
The remaining two indicators refer to the social system: political stability (internal) and 
susceptibility to war (external). We add these to account for latent factors that cannot be fully 
expressed by objective indicators. Degree of political stability and susceptibility to war are in-
dices of the R&I Country Risk Survey (Rating and Investment Information, Inc.). Each of these 
indices is assessed using one of five grades (a = 10, b = 8, c = 6, d = 4, e = 2) by experts 
who are familiar with conditions in the country, and the results are averaged. We therefore have 
objective indicators and expert opinion indicators playing complementary roles in each of the 
two social aspects of nation stability.   
We collected annual data on these six indicators for 97 countries during 1981–2004. The 
information was provided by the United Nations Statistics Division
1
 (UNSD), Global Terrorism 
Database
2
 (GTD) START, Military Balance 1981/1982–2004/2005 (IISS), and the R&I Country 
Risk Survey. We generated six data panels, consisting of four negative and two positive indica-
tors. However, we were forced to exclude the year 1993 from the study period because the ter-
rorism data for 1993 was completely missing from the GTD. It should be noted that we com-
plemented the six panels by interpolating a few missing values. In order to perform DEA com-
putations, we employ normalized scores with a mean of 50 and a variance of 100 for each panel. 
In this way, we treat the extent of deviation within each panel equally across all six indicators.  
 
 
5  Analysis of nation stability shifts 
 
5.1  Country analysis 
 
Using the cumulative indices, we can obtain nation stability shift graphs for any country of in-
terest. Figure 3 presents such graphs for Switzerland, displaying two forms of three cumulative 
indices (𝑀𝐼, 𝐹𝑆, 𝐶𝑈 and 𝑀𝐼−, 𝐹𝑆−, 𝐶𝑈−) in DEA and negative DEA evaluation. 
Switzerland was on the nation stability frontier (𝑔  𝐷1981 ,𝐹1981 = 1) in cross-sectional 
DEA for the first year (1981). In Figure 3(a), The 𝑀𝐼 evaluates the nation stability change of a 
country while accounting for a frontier shift. Note that the nation stability of Switzerland rose, 
reaching its peak in 2002 (12% better than in the first year). Also noteworthy is the movement 
of the nation stability frontier compared to Switzerland’s position on the ever-changing annual 
frontier. The 𝐶𝑈 measures how much closer to the dynamic frontier of nation stability a coun-
try moves each year. However, the cumulative catch-up index of Switzerland is 1 for every year 
of our study. That is, Switzerland was on the frontier throughout the entire period. The 𝐹𝑆 ex-
presses the frontier shift measured from the viewpoint of Switzerland. From Eq. (5), we see 
that the Malmquist and frontier shift indices for Switzerland move together.  
Figure 3(b) illustrates the movements of the three cumulative negative indices for Swit-
zerland determined by Eqs. (11) and  (12) in the DEA−/MI analysis (see subsection 3.2). 
Recall that the DEA
−
 nation stability analysis is a lower-bound evaluation focusing on each 
country’s inferiority (i.e., instability), and thus neglects any superior performance in terms of 
nation stability. It thus implies the least favorable evaluation of each country’s nation stability 
versus a more favorable evaluation, as provided by the DEA nation stability analysis. The 𝐶𝑈−, 
𝐹𝑆−, and 𝑀𝐼− indices indicate the change of distance from the rear, the rear shift, and the na-
tion stability shift of a country, respectively. In figure 3(b), the 𝑀𝐼− shift shows that Switzer-
land’s nation stability of lower-bound evaluation rose during the entire study period, as did its 
upper-bound evaluation. Unlike the upper-bound evaluation, its 𝐹𝑆− and 𝐶𝑈− moved largely 
because they are measured by the rear, which is composed of the most unstable from the view-
points of Switzerland. In particular, its 𝑀𝐼− did not move much in 1991, although its 𝐶𝑈− 
was dramatically far from the rear. That is, its 𝐶𝑈− change was due to the rear shift because its 
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𝐹𝑆− reached its nadir in 1991. Thus, the sets of three cumulative indices give us much valuable 
information about the nation stability shifts for each country. 
Figure 4 shows the nation stability shifts of the USA, China, and Iraq, respectively, in 
both DEA evaluations. Note that the cross-sectional evaluations for the first year (1981) of our 
study, which treat each country as a separate DMU, show USA initially on the frontier and Iraq 
on the rear (𝑓  𝐷1981 ,𝑅1981 = 1). 
From the cumulative 𝑀𝐼− in Figure 4a, we see that the USA’s nation stability improved 
during 1991–2000, but fell in 1991 and 2001. The 𝑀𝐼 of the USA declined during 1990–1992, 
and thereafter increased until 2003. Note that, for the USA, the Gulf War occurred in 1991 and 
the September Eleven Attacks in 2001. In the case of the USA, the 𝑀𝐼− was more sensitive to 
historical events than the 𝑀𝐼. For China (Figure 4b), the 𝑀𝐼 reached its peak in 1985, thereaf-
ter decreasing dramatically to its nadir in 1990. This shows that China’s nation stability rose 
until 1985, and then declined from 1985 to 1990 (in which it was 34.5% worse than in the first 
year). Unlike that of the USA, the 𝑀𝐼−  of China showed hardly any changes during 
1985–1990. Note that the June Fourth Incident in Tiananmen Square occurred in 1989. As Fig-
ure 4c shows, in contrast with the above two countries, Iraq’s 𝑀𝐼 and 𝑀𝐼− show similar 
trends. Viewing the 𝑀𝐼− index, we see that the stability of Iraq was weakest in 1984, and 27% 
worse than in 1981. Its stability then rose to 1.035 in 1990, which is the only year in which Iraq 
was able to escape from the rear. The 𝑀𝐼− of Iraq fell dramatically after 2002, and it ended the 
study period at a 2004 level 22% below that of 1981. That is, it was more unstable then than it 
had been in 1981. The 𝑀𝐼 shows changes similar to those in the 𝑀𝐼−, and decreases together 
with the 𝑀𝐼−. Note that in our study period Iraq experienced three wars: the First Gulf War 
(1980–1988), the Second Gulf War (1990–1991), and the Iraq War (2003). 
In the cases of the USA and China, we can understand the changes in nation stability that 
reflected the epoch by paying attention to 𝑀𝐼 or 𝑀𝐼−. For Iraq, both indices indicated similar 
changes in nation stability. In other words, our results are dependent on whether influences, 
such as the cases, appeared in the bad or good points of the country in nation stability. Further-
more, this also depends on the number of instances of superiority and inferiority of a country, 
compared to the other countries. In this way, we can demonstrate the shifts in nation stability for 
each country, by focusing on two different nation stabilities simultaneously.  
 
 
5.2  Nation stability shifts in general 
 
To evaluate how nation stability changed in general during our study period 1981–2004, we 
computed the average for each cumulative index across all countries 𝑀𝐼 1981,𝛽 , 
𝐹𝑆 1981,𝛽 , and 𝐶𝑈 1981,𝛽 , 𝛽 = 1981,… , 2004 (𝛽 ≠ 1993). The 𝑀𝐼 indices on average 
describe the movements made by the nation stability of the average country. The 𝐹𝑆 indices on 
average indicate shifts of the general frontier nation stability, from the viewpoint of the average 
country. The 𝐶𝑈 indices on average indicate the annual gaps in nation stability between the 
frontier and an average country, which are gaps of nation stability on a general level. Note that 
we employ geometric rather than arithmetic means when averaging the 𝑀𝐼, 𝐹𝑆, and 𝐶𝑈 in-
dices, because they are all multiplicative in nature.  
Figure 5a shows the shift of the cumulative 𝑀𝐼, 𝐹𝑆, and 𝐶𝑈 indices on average in the 
DEA evaluation. In the early years of the study period, 𝑀𝐼 indices did not change much. After 
1989, they decreased, and then improved gradually from 1994 onward. However, relative to 
1981, 𝑀𝐼 was still down nearly 10% when the study period ended in 2004. The 𝐹𝑆 graph 
shows a general upward trend throughout the study period, reaching a peak in 2003 (approx-
imately 9% improvement over 1981). That is, the frontier of nation stability on a general level 
improved gently but fairly consistently from 1981 to 2004. However, the 𝐶𝑈 worsened from 
1988 to 1992, and remained low at the end of the study period (2004, down 15.4% relative to 
1981). This trend means that the average country diverged about 0.8% more every year from the 
11 
annual nation stability frontier. Combining the graphs of 𝑀𝐼 and 𝐹𝑆, we can see that after 
1988 the average 𝑀𝐼 generally fell, and the average 𝐹𝑆 generally rose.  
Figure 5b shows the average shift of the cumulative 𝑀𝐼−, 𝐹𝑆−, and 𝐶𝑈− indices in the 
negative DEA evaluation. In the early years of the study period, 𝑀𝐼− indices did not show a 
consistent pattern of change, but did show steady decreases after 1989. Although 𝑀𝐼− rose 
roughly in parallel with 𝑀𝐼 during the second half of the study period (1994 onward), it dif-
fered by surpassing 1, reaching its peak in 2003 (4.1% better than in its first year). From the 
viewpoint of lower-bound evaluation, this index of nation stability did not change much on av-
erage. However 𝑀𝐼− did worsen by 6.5% between 1989 and 1992. Focusing on the rear shift, 
𝐹𝑆− showed repeated ups and downs, with a maximum year-on-year change of −16.4% (1990 
to 1991). There was no consistent trend in the rear shifts. Our results show that the nation stabil-
ity of unstable countries involves large swings change because the rear shift depends on the sta-
bility of the most unstable countries. We surmise that the nation stability of unstable countries 
moves in this fashion because discontented elements are actualized more easily there than in 
stable countries.  
Through these twin analyses of nation stability on a general level, we observed that the 
year 1989, when the cold war ended, was a watershed. From 1989 to 1992, nation stability at 
large worsened significantly (by 14.8% for 𝑀𝐼, and 6.5% for 𝑀𝐼−, compared to 1981). It ap-
pears that the nadir occurred in 1992, because many countries suffered a large negative-impact 
on their nation stability when the world structure changed, especially in 1991, when the Soviet 
Union collapsed (see Figure 9). Furthermore, the annual gaps in nation stability between the 
most stable country and the average country became clear after 1989. We think that these gaps 
are another result of structural change after the cold war ended. 
 
 
5.3  Frontier and rear shifter countries 
 
The general frontier and rear of nation stability moved during the study period, as shown in 
Figure 5 and is discussed in the preceding subsection. Now, let us examine which countries 
shifted the frontier forward and which shifted the rear backward, year by year, according to Eqs. 
(13) and (14). 
The countries that appear most frequently on the list of frontier-forward and 
rear-backward shifters are as follows. 
 
Frontier-forward shifter 
16 [Switzerland], 10[USA], 9[Singapore] 
 
Rear-backward shifter 
10[Iraq], 7[Peru], 6[North Korea]  
 
Switzerland, USA, and Singapore, as the main frontier shifters, were the greatest contri-
butors to improved nation stability among the best performing countries. Iraq, Peru, and North 
Korea, as the main rear shifters, were most responsible for the declining nation stability among 
the worst performing countries. In particular, Switzerland showed the best stability of 
cross-sectional DEA during the study period, and always achieved the position of the most sta-
ble country in our analysis. These findings help clarify the shifts of nation stability at a general 
level during the study period (see Figure 5). 
Singapore exhibited other interesting results in this metric, even though Singapore was a 
frontier shifter. Singapore also appeared twice in our analysis as a rear back shifter. Note here 
that the nation stability of Singapore was singular in our study, because it occasionally realized 
both the DEA best and the DEA
−
 worst nation stability. Furthermore, Singapore appeared as a 
regular country of high rank only in DEA (stable country), and it was low rank in DEA
− 
(unsta-
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ble country) throughout our study period. As for the high stability level of Singapore, the do-
mestic (internal) social aspect was highly rated, and systematically maintained by its legal sys-
tem. However, Singapore was judged unstable in its economic aspects, because it depends heav-
ily on trade and does not have enough natural resources.  
In contrast, Iraq and North Korea are dubious members of the international community, 
particularly regarding alleged weapons of mass destruction. In particular, Iraq was embroiled in 
war for many years of the study period. Peru often shifted the rear during the 1980s because of 
political instability (many terror incidents occurred). In relation to nation stability in general, 
wobbly rear shifts were contingent on these three countries. Therefore, they are the most unsta-
ble in our analysis. 
 
6  Analysis of unified and split countries  
 
Unified Germany, along with the split Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and their suc-
cessor countries, are included as DMUs in our analysis. However, the traditional method of 
DEA/MI does not enable us to grasp these countries’ changes in nation stability before and after 
the year of unification or split. We propose a new approach to both cases (DMU merger and 
split) by utilizing the following two steps: the handling of data, and the application of DEA/MI 
to cases of merger or split. 
 
 
6.1 Method for analyzing merger and split 
 
Handling of data  
  
When analyzing the merged/split DMUs, we naturally encounter some blanks in the data panels 
because we no longer observe data related to the old national boundaries, such as separate data 
for East and West Germany after reunification in 1990. The normal computation of DEA/MI is 
impractical due to the incomplete panel data. To investigate changes in nation stability before 
and after a unification or split, it is much better to consider the situation as a series of DMUs, 
than to analyze the new and old DMUs separately. To this end, we devised a new way of han-
dling the data. As shown with arrows and coloring in Figure 6, we apply a successor DMU’s 
data to the data of its predecessors, as if they had continued to exist in the post-merger period. In 
the same way, data for a divided DMU are applied to the data of its successor DMUs, as if they 
had already existed during the pre-split period. Note that the DMUs of each year in the portion 
that we colored actually indicate the same DMU. In other words, the succession of DMUs is 
tracked even though they have been formally designated as different DMUs. Therefore, we can 
compute DEA/MI for unified or split countries, and treat them as a series of countries that ex-
isted continuously during the entire study period. Note that care must be taken in regard to va-
riability in the number of DMUs, because the total number of DMUs is significant when aver-
aging the 𝑀𝐼, 𝐶𝑈, and 𝐹𝑆 indices annually. 
 
DEA/MI application to cases of merger or split 
 
We can describe the graphs of DMUs with merger or division by using the handling data men-
tioned above. Figure 7a shows the 𝑀𝐼 shifts of hypothetical DMU P1 and DMU P2, which 
merged in year s, and are thereafter regarded as being a single DMU S. However, there is a se-
rious problem, in the sense that we cannot capture all three DMUs’ chronological changes rela-
tively through the use of only two graphs, due to discordance in and after year s, despite contin-
uing as the new DMU S (i.e., maintaining the same DMU identity). In the case of a split, the 
traditional method of DEA/MI is similarly inadequate. Because unification and split are histori-
cally significant events, we need to find a way to express clearly the shifts before and after the 
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year of unification or split.  
     We propose the following new application of DEA/MI to both cases (merger and split), 
with the aim of evaluating the impact of countries’ unification or split. We designate the mer-
ger/split year as the standard year 𝛼𝑠 = year of merging/dividing in computing the cumulative 
indices (𝑀𝐼𝑗0  𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽 , 𝐶𝑈𝑗0  𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽 , and 𝐹𝑆𝑗0  𝛼𝑠 ,𝛽 ). Note that these indices are here computed 
even when 𝛽 < 𝛼𝑠 following the definitions described in subsection 3.2. We can then grasp 
their shifts before and after the standard year, because the cumulative index values when 
𝛽 =  𝛼𝑠 will all be 1. As a result, we can simultaneously draw the graphs of all three DMUs, as 
shown in Figure 7b.  
In this way, we can comprehend the chronological stability of a unified or split country 
appropriately. (See also Haneda et al. (2009) for a DEA/MI application to the merger of munic-
ipal administrations.)  
 
 
6.2  Analysis of a unified country 
 
Figure 8 shows the shifts in 𝑀𝐼 and 𝑀𝐼− for successor (reunified) Germany relative to the 
standard year 1990. These graphs cover both pre- and post-unification, and indicate chronologi-
cal changes in 𝑀𝐼 and 𝑀𝐼− relative to the standard year. In the pre-unification period, there 
was no consistent trend in nation stability because the annual variations of 𝑀𝐼 and 𝑀𝐼− were 
large. The indices of both East and West Germany regressed together as 1990 (the reunification 
year) approached, then the reunified (successor) Germany’s nation stability gradually improved. 
In the post-unification period, 𝑀𝐼 and 𝑀𝐼− improved on average 6.2% and 5.9%, respectively, 
relative to the merger year 1990. Both of these indices for the predecessor countries were on 
average approximately 2% and 4% below the level of post-1990. Therefore we can see that the 
reunification of Germany improved nation stability in the post-unification period. 
    Comparing the 𝑀𝐼 and 𝑀𝐼− for East and West Germany before 1990, we see that the 
stability (𝑀𝐼) related to the upper-bound evaluation for East Germany was better than that for 
West Germany, but the instability (𝑀𝐼−) related to the lower-bound evaluation for East Germa-
ny was worse than that for West Germany. West Germany was one of the more stable countries 
in our ranking of both cross-sectional evaluations for the pre-unification period, but it did not 
have any preeminent factors (good or bad) in regard to nation stability. In contrast, East Ger-
many had outstanding faults, if we view it during one phase, but it was a stable country during a 
different phase. In sum, we find that the reunified Germany steadily improved its nation stability 
by both enhancing the virtues and making up for the shortcomings that had prevailed during the 
era of divided East and West Germany. 
   
 
6.3  Analysis of split countries 
 
In Figure 9, we illustrate the break-up of the Soviet Union, which was the representative case of 
a split country in our study. We adopted the splitting year 1991 as the standard year for compu-
ting the cumulative indices. We present all graphs for the Soviet Union and every successor 
country. The single graph before 1991 shows shifts in the nation stability (𝑀𝐼) of the Soviet 
Union, and the 15 graphs after 1991 indicate changes in the nation stability (𝑀𝐼) of the 15 suc-
cessor countries. Viewing the pre-1991 graph, we see that the nation stability of the Soviet Un-
ion declined sharply after 1988, and was 58% lower in 1991 than it had been at its peak in 1987 
(it remained at a comparatively high level from 1981 to 1988). After 1991, most of the succes-
sor countries, including Russia, struggled for about a decade to improve their nation stability. 
However, the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) improved their stability relatively 
quickly in the post-split period, eventually reaching peaks that were approximately 39–46% 
better than in the splitting year. These three countries successfully shed the disorder that fol-
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lowed the Soviet Union’s break-up, re-established their own identity, and improved their nation 
stability. We thus see that the Soviet Union’s break-up had a strong negative-impact on the na-
tion stability of most of its successor countries. 
    Let us now look at three cases of split countries together. Figure 10 portrays the shifts of 
𝑀𝐼 and 𝑀𝐼− for the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Note that the standard 
year is defined as the respective splitting year αs = 𝑡, which was fixed as the benchmark. 
Looking at the shifts of 𝑀𝐼 (Figure 10a), we see that Czechoslovakia’s nation stability began to 
worsen dramatically about three years before the split (similar to the case of the Soviet Union), 
and ended up 49% lower than it had been six years before the splitting year. Like its 𝑀𝐼, Cze-
choslovakia’s 𝑀𝐼− started to decline three years before the split, sinking over 10% compared 
to year t−6 (Figure 10b). In the case of Yugoslavia, the 𝑀𝐼 did not fall as much as in the Soviet 
Union or Czechoslovakia, but its 𝑀𝐼− deteriorated sharply. Yugoslavia’s upper-bound evalua-
tion began to fall five years before the split, but its instability (lower-bound evaluation) dropped 
suddenly, falling more than 55% in the two years before the split. In contrast, for the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia, both indices began to drop at roughly the same time. We surmise 
that the deterioration of 𝑀𝐼 precipitated the decline of 𝑀𝐼− in Yugoslavia. However, in gen-
eral, each of three countries had one index drop approximately 50% (or more) compared to a 
point several years before the split. So, it is reasonable to conclude that the countries’ splits re-
sulted from the precipitous declines in their Malmquist Indices. Thus, we could verify cata-
strophic decays in nation stability for the split countries in this study. This result may be valid 
for most countries that have split. 
 
 
7   Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper presented a new DEA methodology for analyzing shifts in nation stability, and ap-
plied it to data for the period 1981–2004. Nation stability was defined as the state of a country’s 
social and economic system. In contrast to earlier researchers, we incorporated influences 
emerging from each country, by measuring its external effect on the nation stability of other 
countries. Applying panel data from 97 countries to both DEA/MI and DEA
−
/MI analyses, we 
were able to evaluate shifts in nation stability, which in the past have been difficult to quantify. 
     Shifts in each country’s nation stability were analyzed using the cumulative catch-up, 
frontier shift, and Malmquist indices, via both DEA and DEA
−
. We differentiated stable coun-
tries and unstable countries within the set of 97 countries. Our analyses of nation stability at the 
country level found that Switzerland was the most stable in terms of the stability frontier 
throughout the entire study period, while Iraq was the most unstable in terms of the stability rear 
for every year except 1995. On a general level, the gaps in nation stability expanded after the 
cold war ended, which means that the most stable countries were increasing their stability, while 
the other countries were experiencing reduced stability. In other words, the end of the cold war 
marked a turning point in regard to nation stability.  
We also analyzed countries that merged or split during the study period. We visually 
demonstrated shifts for unified or split countries, by graphing the reunified Germany and the 
successor countries of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. It is noteworthy that 
the nation stability of each split country worsened by approximately 50%, or more, compared to 
a point several years before their respective splits. Therefore, we surmise that countries’ splits 
arise as a result of significant drops in nation stability. Thus, we were able to verify catastrophic 
decays in nation stability for all the split countries in this study. 
This study enabled us to quantify shifts in a country’s nation stability, a concept that has 
importance for policy makers, and for international relations. In unstable countries, improving 
nation stability is a specific remedy for uplifting civil QOL. Many international organizations 
could utilize this concept for their specialized activities (e.g., agreements about border police, 
which can use indicators of (in)stability to deal with threats from foreign countries, and other 
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decision-making related to homeland security).  
From a methodological point of view, we introduced a new DEA/MI application for 
country mergers and splits, which enabled us to present the DEA/MI shift graphs that show both 
new and old (merged or split) DMUs together. This approach provides a good way to compre-
hend chronological shifts in DEA/MI before and after a country merger or split. We hope that 
such innovations will open up new directions in the development and application of 
DEA/Malmquist index-based models. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 GTD web page: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
2 UNSD web page: http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d. 
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Fig. 1. The four aspects of a country that constitute its nation stability 
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Fig. 2. DEA efficiency changes with the frontier and rear shifting over time 
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Fig. 3. Cumulative catch-up, frontier shift, and Malmquist indices for Switzerland 
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Fig. 4. Cumulative 𝑀𝐼 and 𝑀𝐼− indices for three selected countries 
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Fig. 5. Nation stability shifts in general 1981–2004  
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case of merger 
       
  
year 
  
s−3 s−2 s−1 s s+1 s+2 s+3 
predecessor 
DMU P1 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
DMU P2 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
successor DMU S 
   
○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
year s: merged year  →: copying data 
 
case of split 
       
  
year 
  
t−3 t−2 t−1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 
predecessor DMU P ○ ○ ○ ○ 
  
 
successor DMU S1 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
DMU S2 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
DMU S3 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 year t: split year     →: copying data 
 
 
Fig. 6. Creating continuity of data set for merged DMUs and split DMUs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
computing 
computing 
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(a) 𝑀𝐼 𝑠 − 3, 𝛽  (𝛽 = 𝑠 − 3, … , 𝑠 + 3) 
 
 
(b) 𝑀𝐼 𝑠, 𝛽  (𝛽 = 𝑠 − 3, … , 𝑠 + 3) 
 
 
Fig. 7. Cumulative indices for merged DMUs 
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Fig. 8. 𝑀𝐼 1990, 𝛽  and 𝑀𝐼− 1990, 𝛽  for East, West, and reunified Germany 
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Fig. 9. Cumulative indices 𝑀𝐼 1991, 𝛽  for the former Soviet Union and its successor countries 
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(a) Shifts of 𝑀𝐼 𝑡, 𝛽  for Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia 
 
(b) Shifts of 𝑀𝐼− 𝑡, 𝛽  for Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia 
 
 
Fig. 10. Changes in nation stability leading up to a split 
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Table 1  
Typical phenomena in the four aspects of social and economic systems 
  internal  external 
economy ・economic advance 
・infrastructure 
・money and banking system 
・national resources 
・geographical condition 
 ・international trade 
・infrastructure 
・geographical condition 
society ・political violence 
・political freedom 
・civil liberty 
・crime 
・terrorism 
・law and order 
・schools and education 
・medical and health care  
 ・external aggression 
・cross-border invasion 
・international crime 
・infectious disease 
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Table A.1  
Set of 97 sample countries 
Region Country Region Country 
Africa Algeria USSR Soviet Union (–1991) 
Egypt Estonia (1992–) 
Tunisia Latvia (1992–) 
Morocco Lithuania (1992–) 
Libya Azerbaijan (1992–) 
Ghana Armenia (1992–) 
Nigeria Ukraine (1992–) 
Gabon Uzbekistan (1992–) 
Kenya Kazakhstan (1992–) 
Tanzania Kyrgyz (1992–) 
Zambia Georgia (1992–) 
Zimbabwe Tajikistan (1992–) 
South Africa 
 
Turkmenistan (1992–) 
 
 
Belarus (1992–) 
Asia North Korea Moldova (1992–) 
South Korea Russia (1992–) 
Taiwan  
 China Europe Ireland 
Indonesia UK 
Singapore Sweden 
Thailand Denmark 
Philippines Norway 
Malaysia Finland 
India Austria 
Sri Lanka Netherlands 
Pakistan Switzerland 
Bangladesh Germany 
UAE East Germany 
Israel West Germany 
Iraq France 
Iran Belgium 
Oman Italy 
Kuwait Spain 
Saudi Arabia Portugal 
Turkey Greece 
Bahrain Yugoslavia (–1991) 
 
 
Slovenia (1992–) 
North 
America 
USA Croatia (1992–) 
Canada Macedonia (1992–) 
Mexico Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–) 
 
 
Serbia and Montenegro (1992–) 
South 
America 
Argentina Czechoslovakia (–1992) 
Uruguay Slovakia (1993–) 
Ecuador Czech (1993–) 
Colombia Hungary 
Chile Poland 
Paraguay Romania 
Brazil 
  Venezuela Oceania Australia 
Peru New Zealand 
Bolivia Papua New Guinea 
 
